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Abstract
This paper studies predatory trading : trading that induces and/or exploits
other investors' need to reduce their positions. We show that if one trader needs
to sell, others also sell and subsequently buy back the asset. This leads to price
overshooting, and a reduced liquidation value for the distressed trader. Hence,
the market is illiquid when liquidity is most needed. Further, a trader prots
from triggering another trader's crisis, and the crisis can spill over across traders
and across assets.
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1 Introduction
Large traders fear a forced liquidation, especially if their need to liquidate is known
by other traders. For example, hedge funds with (nearing) margin calls may need to
liquidate, and this could be known to certain counterparties such as the bank financing
the trade; similarly, traders who use portfolio insurance, stop loss orders, or other risk
management strategies can be known to liquidate in response to price drops; certain
institutions have to (or have an incentive to) liquidate bonds that are downgraded or
in default; index funds must re-arrange their portfolios in response to index inclusions
and deletions; and intermediaries who take on large derivative positions must hedge
them by trading the underlying security. A forced liquidation is often very costly since
it is associated with large price impact and low liquidity.
We provide a new framework for studying the strategic interaction between large
traders. Some of these traders can be driven into financial difficulty, and their need to
liquidate is known by the other strategic traders. All agents trade continuously and
limit their trading intensity to minimize the temporary price impact cost.
Our analysis shows that if a distressed large investor is forced to unwind his position
(and needs liquidity the most), other strategic traders initially trade in the same direc-
tion. That is, to profit from price swings, other traders conduct predatory trading and
withdraw liquidity instead of providing it. This predatory activity makes liquidation
costly and leads to price overshooting. Moreover, predatory trading itself can drive out
of the market a vulnerable trader who could have otherwise remained solvent.
These findings are in line with anecdotal evidence as summarized in Table 1. A well-
known example of predatory trading is the alleged trading against LTCM’s positions
in the fall of 1998. Business Week wrote that “if lenders know that a hedge fund needs
to sell something quickly, they will sell the same asset – driving the price down even
faster. Goldman, Sachs & Co. and other counterparties to LTCM did exactly that in
1998.”1 Also, Cai (2002) finds that “locals” on the CBOE pits exploited knowledge of
LTCM’s short positions in the treasury bond futures market. Another indication of
the fear of predatory trading is evident in the opposition to UBS Warburg’s proposal
to take over Enron’s traders without taking over its trading positions. This proposal
was opposed on the grounds that “it would present a ‘predatory trading risk’ because
Enron’s traders would effectively know the contents of the trading book.”2 Similarly,
many institutional investors are forced by law or their own charter to sell bonds of
companies which undergo debt restructuring procedures. Hradsky and Long (1989)
documents price overshooting in the bond market after default announcements.
Furthermore, our model shows that an adverse wealth shock to one large trader,
coupled with predatory trading, can lead to a price drop that brings other traders
in financial difficulty, leading to further predation and so on. This ripple effect can
1“The Wrong Way to Regulate Hedge Funds”, Business Week, February 26th, 2001, page 90.
2AFX News Limited, AFX – Asia, January 18th, 2002.
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cause a widespread crisis in the financial sector. Consistently, the testimony of Alan
Greenspan in the U.S. House of Representatives on Oct. 1st, 1998 indicates that the
Federal Reserve Bank was worried that LTCM’s financial difficulties might destabilize
the financial system as a whole:
“. . . the act of unwinding LTCM’s portfolio would not only have a sig-
nificant distorting impact on market prices but also in the process could
produce large losses, or worse, for a number of creditors and counterpar-
ties, and for other market participants who were not directly involved with
LTCM.”
Our model also provides guidance for the valuation of large security positions. We
distinguish between three forms of value, with increasing emphasis on the position’s liq-
uidity. Specifically, the “paper value” is the current mark-to-market value of a position;
the “orderly liquidation value” reflects the revenue one could achieve by secretly liq-
uidating the position; and the “distressed liquidation value” equals the amount which
can be raised if one faces predation by other strategic traders, that is, with endogenous
market liquidity. The analysis shows that the paper value exceeds the orderly liquida-
tion value, which typically exceeds the distressed liquidation value. Hence, if a large
trader estimates “impact costs” based on normal (orderly) market behavior then he
may under-estimate his actual cost in case of an acute need to sell because predation
makes liquidity time-varying and, in particular, predation reduces liquidity when large
traders need it the most. Consistently, Pastor and Stambaugh (2002) and Acharya and
Pedersen (2002) find measures of liquidity risk to be priced.
Our analysis also has normative implications for the design of hedge fund disclosure
requirements. Large hedge funds that are active in illiquid markets should face less
stringent disclosure standards than funds holding liquid assets or funds that are smaller
in size. This is consistent with the disclosure guidelines described in the consensus
statement by the IAFE Investor Risk Committee (IRC), which consists both of hedge
funds and hedge fund investors. IRC (2001) states that “large hedge funds need to
limit granularity of reporting to protect themselves against predatory trading against
the fund’s position.” In the same vein, market makers at the London Stock Exchange
prefer to delay the reporting of large transactions since it gives them “a chance to
reduce a large exposure, rather than alerting the rest of the market and exposing them
to predatory trading tactics from others.”3
Our work is related to several strands of literature. First, our model provides
a natural example of “destabilizing speculation” by showing that although strategic
traders stabilize prices most of the time, their predatory behavior can destabilize prices
in times of financial crisis. This contributes to an old debate, see Friedman (1953), Hart
and Kreps (1986), DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990), and references
3Financial Times, June 5th, 1990, section I, page 12.
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therein. Market impact due to asymmetric information is studied by Kyle (1985), while
trading with exogenous market impact is studied theoretically by Cetin, Jarrow, and
Protter (2002) and empirically by Chen, Stanzl, and Watanabe (2002), and others, but
these papers do not consider the strategic effects of forced liquidation. The notion of
predatory trading partially overlaps with that of stock price manipulation, which is
studied by Allen and Gale (1992) among others. One distinctive feature of predatory
trading is that the predator derives profit from the price impact of the prey and not
from his own price impact. Attari, Mello, and Rurading
gate demand of
Y (p) =
1
λ
(µ− p), (1)
depending on the current price p. We assume that the demand curve is downward slop-
ing. This assumption is consistent with empirical findings of Shleifer (1986), Chan and
Lakonishok (1995), Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002) and others.5 Theoretically, there
are several mechanisms that can produce downward sloping demand curves including
investor heterogeneity and risk aversion. For example, the demand curve is linearly
downward sloping if each individual investor has constant absolute risk aversion and if
the payoff v is normally distributed.
Strategic traders, i ∈ {1, 2, ..., I}, are risk-neutral and seek to maximize their ex-
pected profit. Each strategic trader is large, and hence, his trading impacts the equilib-
rium price. He therefore acts strategically and takes his price impact into account when
submitting his orders. Each strategic trader i has a given initial endowment, xi(0), of
the risky asset and he can continuously trade the asset. In particular, strategic trader
i chooses his trading intensity, ai (t). Hence, his position, xi (t), in the risky asset at t
is
xi (t) = xi (0) +
∫ t
0
ai(τ)dτ . (2)
We assume that each large strategic trader is restricted to hold
xi(t) ∈ [−x¯, x¯] , (3)
and that S > Ix¯. These assumptions imply that the total capital of strategic investors
is not sufficient to make the price equal to the expected value of the asset E(v) = µ.
We consider this case since we are interested in the strategic interactions that arise
if large traders do not have sufficient capital. Unlimited holdings by strategic traders
imply the trivial outcome that p = µ.
Furthermore, large strategic traders are subject to a risk of financial crisis. Sec-
tion 4.1 assumes that there is an exogenous set of agents in crisis, whereas Section 4.2
deals with the case of endogenous crisis. We denote the set of “distressed” traders in
crisis by Ic and the set of unaffected traders, the “predators,” by Ip. If a strategic
trader is in financial crisis, he must liquidate his position in the risky asset. Formally,
i ∈ Ic ⇒


ai(t) ≤ −A
I
if x(t) > 0 and t > t0
ai(t) = 0 if x(t) = 0 and t > t0
ai(t) ≥ A
I
if x(t) < 0 and t > t0.
(4)
This statement says that a trader in crisis must liquidate his position at least as fast
as A/I. This is the fastest that an agent can liquidate without incurring temporary
5These papers dispute Scholes (1972), which concludes that the demand curve is almost flat.
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price impact costs — to be discussed below — if all other traders are liquidating at
the same time.6
The assumption of forced liquidation can be explained by (external or internal)
agency problems. Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) shows that an optimal financial con-
tract may leave an agent cash constrained even if the agent is subject to predation
risk.7 Also, limited capital for a certain strategy and forced liquidation can be the
result of a company’s risk management policy. We note that our results do not depend
qualitatively on the nature of the troubled agents’ liquidation strategy, nor do they
depend on the assumption that such agents must liquidate their entire position. It
suffices that a troubled large trader must reduce his position before time T .
The trading mechanism works in the following way. In each instant, all orders are
executed simultaneously with the same priority. The market clearing price p(t) satisfies
the condition that supply equals demand. That is, Y (p) + X(t) = S, where X is the
aggregate holding of risky assets by all strategic traders,
X (t) =
I∑
i=1
xi (t) . (5)
Hence, the price is seen, using (1), to be
p (t) = µ− λ (S −X (t)) . (6)
As long as the total net trade of the strategic traders is not too large, that is, as long
as ∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i
ai(t)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ A, (7)
all orders in this instant are executed at the current price p (t). If |∑i ai(t)| > A, there
is a temporary price impact of γ for the orders beyond A. More precisely, investor i
incurs a cost of
G
(
ai (t) , a−i (t)
)
:= γ max
{
0, ai − a, a− ai}
where a−i (t) :=
(
a1 (t) , . . . , ai−1 (t) , ai+1 (t) , . . . , aI (t)
)
and where a = a (a−i (t)) and
a = a (a−i (t)) are, respectively, the unique solutions to
a +
∑
j,j 6=i
min
(
aj, a
)
= A;
a +
∑
j,j 6=i
max
(
aj, a
)
= A.
6We will see later that, in equilibrium, a troubled trader who must liquidate maximizes his profit
by initially liquidating at this speed. Liquidating fast minimizes the costs of front-running by other
traders.
7Even though Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) focuses on predation in product markets and not
financial markets, their argument is general.
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In words, a (a) is the highest intensity with which trader i can buy (sell) without
incurring the cost associated with
3 Preliminary Analysis
In this section, we show how to solve a trader’s problem. For this, we re-write trader
i’s problem (8) as a constant (which depends on x(0)) plus
λSxi(T )− 1
2
λ
[
xi (T )
]2 − λ
∫ T
0
[
ai (t) X−i (t) + G(ai (t) , a−i (t))
]
dt,
where we use E(v) = µ, the expression (6) for the price, the relation
∫ T
0
ai (t) xi (t) dt =
1
2
[
x (t)2
]T
0
, and where we define
X−i (t) :=
∑
j=1,...,I, j 6=i
xj (t) . (9)
Under our standing assumptions, it can be shown that any optimal trading strategy
satisfies xi(T ) = x¯ if trader i is not in distress. That is, the trader ends up with the
maximum capital in the arbitrage position. Furthermore, it is not optimal to incur
the temporary impact cost. That is, each trader optimally keeps his trading intensity
within his bounds a and a. Hence, we have the following result, which is useful in
solving each trader’s optimization problem and deriving the equilibrium.
Lemma 1 A trader’s problem can be written as
min
ai( · )∈Ai
∫ T
0
ai (t) X−i (t) dt
s.t. xi(T ) = xi(0) +
∫ T
0
ai (t) dt = x¯ if i ∈ Ip
ai(t) ∈ [a (a−i (t)) , a (a−i (t))] .
The lemma shows that the trader’s problem is to minimize
∫
ai (t) X−i (t) dt, that
is, to minimize his trading cost, not taking into account his own price impact. This
is because the model is set up such that the trader cannot make or lose money based
on the way his own trades affect prices. (For example, λ is assumed to be constant.)
Rather, the trader makes money by exploiting the way in which the other traders affect
prices (through X−i). This distinguishes predatory trading from price manipulation.9
4 The Predatory Phase (t ∈ [t0, T ])
We first consider the “predatory phase,” that is, the period [t0, T ] in which some
strategic traders face financial distress. In Section 6, we analyze the full game including
9See, for instance, Allen and Gale (1992) for an example of price manipulation.
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the “investment phase” [0, t0) in which traders decide the size of their initial (arbitrage)
positions. We assume that each strategic large trader has a given position in the risky
asset of x(t0) ∈ (0, x¯] at time t0. Furthermore, we assume for simplicity that there is
“sufficient” time to trade, t0 + 2x¯I/A < T .
We proceed in two stages. Section 4.1 analyzes how strategic traders exploit the
fact that others must liquidate their position and the implied price effects. Section 4.2
endogenizes agents’ default and studies how traders may force others out of the market,
possibly leading to a wide-spread crisis.
4.1 Exogenous Default
Here, we take as given the set, Ic, of distressed traders, and the common initial holding,
x(t0), of all strategic traders. A distressed trader j sells, in equilibrium, his shares at
constant speed aj = −A/I from t0 until t0 + x(t0)I/A, and thereafter aj = 0. This
behavior is optimal, as will be clear later. This liquidation strategy is known, in
equilibrium, by all the strategic traders.
The predators’ strategies are more interesting. We first consider the simplest case
in which there is a single predator, and subsequently we consider the case with multiple
competing predators.
4.1.1 Single Predator (Ip = 1)
In the case with a single predator, the strategic interaction is simple: the predator,
say i, is merely choosing his optimal trading strategy given the known liquidation
strategy of the traders in crisis. Specifically, the distressed traders’ total position, X−i,
is decreasing to 0, and it is constant thereafter. Hence, using Lemma 1, we get the
following equilibrium.
Proposition 1 With Ip = 1, the following describes an equilibrium:10 Each distressed
trader sells with constant speed A/I for τ = x(t0)
A/I
periods. The predator sells as fast
as he can without causing a temporary price impact for τ time periods, and then buys
back for x¯/A periods. That is,
ai∗ (t) =


−A/I for t ∈ [t0, t0 + τ)
A for t ∈ [t0 + τ , t0 + τ + x¯A)
0 for t ≥ t0 + τ + x¯A .
(10)
10The predator’s profit does not depend on how fast he buys back his shares as long as he does not
incur temporary impact costs and as long as he ends fully invested. Hence, there are other equilibria
in which the predator buys back at a slower rate. These equilibria are, however, qualitatively the
same as the one stated in the proposition, and there is no other equilibrium than these ones.
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The price overshoots; the price dynamics is
p∗ (t) =


p (t0)− λA [t− t0] for t ∈ [t0, t0 + τ)
p (t0)− λIx (t0) + λA [t− (t0 + τ)] for t ∈ [t0 + τ , t0 + τ + x¯A)
µ + λ [x¯− S] for t ≥ t0 + τ + x¯A
(11)
where p (t0) = µ + λ (Ix (t0)− S).
We see that although the surviving strategic trader wants to end up with all his
capital invested in the arbitrage position (xi(T ) = x¯), he is selling as long as the
liquidating trader is selling. He is selling to profit from the price swings that occur
in the wake of the liquidation. The predatory trader would like to “front-run” the
distressed trader by selling before him and buying back shares after the distressed
trader has pushed down the price further. Since both traders can sell at the same
speed, the equilibrium is that they sell simultaneously and the predator buys back
in the end. (The case in which predators can sell earlier than distressed traders is
considered in Section 7.1.)
The selling by the predatory trader leads to price “overshooting.” The price falls
not only because the distressed trader is liquidating, but also because the predatory
trader is selling as well. After the distressed trader is done selling, the predatory trader
starts buying until he is at his capacity, and this pushes the price up towards its new
equilibrium level.
The predatory trader is profiting from the distressed trader’s liquidation for two
reasons. First, the predator can sell his assets for an average price that is higher
than the price at which he can buy them back after the distressed trader has left the
market. Second, the predator can buy the additional units cheaply until he reaches his
capacity. Hence, the predator has an incentive to try to cause the distressed trader’s
liquidation. We discuss in Section 4.2 how a predator may try to drive a vulnerable
trader in bankruptcy by selling shares and causing a price drop.
The predatory behavior by the surviving agent makes liquidation excessively costly
for the distressed agent. To see this, suppose a trader estimates the liquidity in “normal
times,” that is, when no trader is in distress. The liquidity — as defined by the price
sensitivity to demand changes — is given by λ in Equation (6). When liquidity is
needed by the distressed trader, however, the liquidity is lower due to the fact that the
predator is selling as well. Specifically, the price moves by Iλ for each unit the distressed
trader is selling. Endogenous liquidity and its pricing implications are discussed further
in Section 5.
The distressed trader’s excess liquidation cost equals the predator’s profit from
preying. Note that the predators do not exploit the group of long-term investors. The
price overshooting implies that long-term investors are buying shares and selling them
at the same price. Hence, it does not matter for the group of long-term investors
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whether the predator preys or not.11
Numerical Example We illustrate this predatory behavior with a numerical exam-
ple. We let I = 2, Ic = Ip = 1, λ = 1, µ = 140, S = 40, t0 = 5, T = 7, A = 20,
x(t0) = 8, and x¯ = 10. Figure 1 illustrates the holdings of the distressed trader: This
trader starts liquidating his position of 8 shares at time t0 = 5 with a trading inten-
sity of A/2 = 10 shares per time unit. He is done liquidating at time 5.8. At time
5, the predator knows that this liquidation will take place, and, further, he realizes
that the price will drop in response. Hence, he wants to sell high and buy back low.
The predator optimally sells all his 8 shares simultaneously with the distressed trader’s
liquidation, and, thereafter, he buys back 10 shares, reaching his capacity, as shown in
Figure 2.
Figure 3 shows the price dynamics. The price is falling from time 5 to time 5.8
when both strategic traders are selling. Since 16 shares are sold and λ = 1, the price
drops 16 points, falling to 100 below its long-run level of 110. Hence, there is a price
overshooting of 10. As the predator re-builds his position from time 5.8 to time 6.3,
the price recovers to 110.
It is intriguing that the predator is selling even when the price is below its long-run
level 110. This behavior is optimal because, as long as the distressed trader is selling,
the price will drop further and the predator can profit from selling additional shares
and later repurchasing them. To further explain this point, we consider the predator’s
profit if he sells one share less. In this case, the predator sells 7 shares from time 5 to
time 5.7, waits for the distressed trader to finish selling at time 5.8, and then buys 9
shares from time 5.8 to time 6.25. The price dynamics in this case is illustrated by the
dotted line in Figure 4. We see that the 9 shares are bought back at the same prices as
the last 9 shares were bought in the case where the predator continues to sell as long
as the distressed trader does. Hence, to compare the profit in the two cases, we focus
on the price at which the 10th (and last) share is sold and bought back. This share is
sold at prices between 102 and 100, that is, with an average price of 101. It is bought
back for prices between 100 and 101, that is, for an average price of 100.50. Hence,
this “extra” trade is profitable, earning a profit of 101-100.50=0.50.
Our results are driven by the inability to trade a large position instantly and the
price impact of a large position. The results do not, however, depend crucially on the
specifics of our assumptions. The robustness of our results should be clear from the
numerical example. Since the distressed trader’s liquidation depresses the price, the
predator has an incentive to sell high and buy low, and this action by the predator
leads to price overshooting and costly liquidation.
11Long-term investors could profit from using a predatory strategy. We assume, however, that these
investors do not have sufficient skills and information to do that.
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Figure 1: Holdings of distressed trader Figure 2: Holdings of predator
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Figure 3: Price dynamics
Figure 4: Price dynamics if predator
sells 1 share less
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4.1.2 Multiple Predators (Ip ≥ 2)
We saw in the previous example how a single predatory trader has an incentive to
“front run” the distressed trader by selling as long as the distressed trader is selling.
With multiple surviving traders this incentive remains, but another effect is introduced:
These predators want to end up with all their capital in the arbitrage position and they
want to buy their shares sooner than the other strategic traders do.
The proposition below shows that, in equilibrium, predators sell for a while and
then start buying back before the distressed traders have finished their liquidation.
Proposition 2 With Ip ≥ 2 and x (t0) ≥ Ip−1I−1 x¯, in the unique symmetric equilibrium,
each distressed trader sells with constant speed A/I for x(t0)
A/I
periods. Each predator
i ∈ Ip sells at trading intensity A/I for τ := x(t0)−
Ip−1
I−1
x¯
A/I
periods and buys back shares
at a trading intensity of AI
c
I(Ip−1)
until t0 +
x(t0)
A/I
. That is,
ai∗ (t) =


−A/I for t ∈ [t0, t0 + τ)
AIc
I(Ip−1)
for t ∈ [t0 + τ , t0 + x(t0)A/I )
0 for t ≥ t0 + x(t0)A/I .
(12)
The price overshoots; the price dynamics are
p∗ (t) =


p (t0)− λA [t− t0] for t ∈ [t0, t0 + τ)
p (t0)− λAτ + λ AIcI(Ip−1) [t− (t0 + τ)] for t ∈ [t0 + τ , t0 + x(t0)A/I )
µ + λ [x¯Ip − S] for t ≥ t0 + x(t0)A/I ,
(13)
where p (t0) = µ + λIx (t0)− λS.
The proposition shows that price overshooting also occurs in the case of multiple
predators. This is because the predators’ strategic behavior and limited capital make
them sell excessively at first, and start buying relatively late. Note that, from each
predator’s perspective, X−i (t) (the stockholding of all other traders) is declining until
t0 + τ and is constant thereafter. Since predator i also sells until t0 + τ , aggregate
stock holdings X (t) and the price overshoot. The size of the overshooting is driven
by trading activity of one predator. In other words, if hypothetically one predator
refrained from preying and the others preyed using their equilibrium strategies, then
there would be no overshooting.
The proposition states that the overshooting happens as long as traders’ initial
holding is large enough relative to the their position limit, that is, x (t0) ≥ Ip−1I−1 x¯.
Traders optimally choose such large positions if the risk of default is not too large as
described carefully in Section 6. If, on the other hand, the traders’ initial position,
x(t0), is low, then there is no overshooting since the liquidated position is simply
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absorbed by the competing surviving predators. This follows from Proposition 2’ in
Appendix A.
The price overshooting is lower if there are more predators since more predators
behave more competitively:
Proposition 3 Keep the fraction, Ip/I, of predators, the total arbitrage capacity, Ix¯,
and the total initial stock holding, Ix (t0) constant, and assume that Ix(t0) ≥ Ipx¯. The
price overshooting
(i) is strictly positive for all finite Ip;
(ii) is decreasing in the number of predators Ip; and
(iii) approaches 0 as Ip approaches infinity.
Numerical Example We consider the cases with a total number of traders I = 3,
9, and 27. For each case, we assume that a third of the traders are in crisis, that is,
Ic/I = 1/3. As in the previous example, we let λ = 1, µ = 140, S = 40, t0 = 5,
T = 7, the total trading speed A = 20, the total initial holding x(t0) · I = 16, and the
total trader holding capacity x¯ · I = 20. Figure 5 illustrates the holdings of predatory
traders and Figure 6 shows the price dynamics.
We see that there is a substantial price overshooting when the number of predators
is small, and that the overshooting is decreasing as the number of predators increases.
More predators increase the competitive pressure to buy shares early. Hence, the
liquidation cost for a distressed trader is decreasing in the number of predators (even
holding the total trading capacity fixed).
We note a striking difference between the case of one predator and the case with
several predators. With a single predator, the predator keeps selling until the distressed
traders have finished their liquidation, whereas with several predators the competitive
pressure makes the predators buy back earlier and finish buying back at the same time
as the distressed traders have finished their selling.
Collusion. The predators can profit from collusion. In particular, they could in-
crease their revenue from predation by selling until the troubled traders were finished
liquidating and only then start rebuilding their positions. Hence, through collusion,
the predators could jointly act like a single predator (with the slight modification that
multiple predators have more capital). Collusive and non-collusive outcomes are quali-
tatively different. A collusive outcome is characterized by predators buying shares only
after the troubled traders have left the market and by a large price overshooting. In
contrast, a non-collusive outcome is characterized by predators buying all the shares
they need by the time the troubled traders have finished liquidating and by a relatively
smaller price over-shooting.
Collusion could potentially occur through an explicit arranged agreement or im-
plicitly without arrangement, called “tacit” collusion. Tacit collusion means that the
Figure 5: Holdings, xi(t), of each predator Figure 6: Price dynamics
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collusive outcome is the equilibrium in a non-cooperative game. In our model, tacit
collusion cannot occur. However, if strategic traders could observe (or infer) each oth-
ers’ trading activity, then tacit collusion might arise because predators could “punish”
a predator that deviates from the collusive strategy.12
4.2 Endogenous Default and Systemic Risk
So far we have assumed that a certain set of large strategic traders exogenously fall
into financial distress, without specifying the underlying cause. In this section, we
endogenize distress and study how predatory activity can lead to contagious default
events. If a trader’s wealth drops to a threshold level W , he must liquidate. This is
because of margin constraints, risk management, or other considerations in connection
with low wealth. Trader i’s wealth at t consists of his position xi (t) of the asset that
our analysis focuses on, as well as wealth held in other assets Oi (t). That is, his “paper
wealth” is W i (t) = xi (t) p (t)+Oi (t). The value of the other holdings Oi (t) is subject
to an exogenous shock at time t0, which can be observed by all traders. Thereafter,
Oi (t) stays constant.
Obviously, if the wealth shock ∆Oi at t0 is so large that W
i (t0) ≤ W , the trader is
immediately in distress and must liquidate. Smaller negative shocks with W i (t0) > W
can, however, also lead to an “endogenous default,” since the potential selling behavior
of predators and other distressed traders may erode the wealth of trader i even further.
12If traders could observe each others’ trades, then we would have to change our definition of
strategies and equilibrium accordingly. A rigorous analysis of such a model is beyond the scope of
this paper.
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That is, predation can drive other traders into bankruptcy. A trader who knows that he
must liquidate in the future finds it optimal to start selling already at time t0. The set
of traders who anticipate having to liquidate is denoted by I c as in previous sections.
Interestingly, whether an agent anticipates having to liquidate depends on the number
of other agents who are expected to be in crisis.
We let W (Ic) be the maximum wealth at t0 such that trader i cannot avoid financial
crisis if Ic traders are expected to be in crisis. More precisely, for I c > 0, it is the maxi-
mum wealth such that, for any feasible strategy it holds that mint∈[t0,T ] W
i(t, ai, a−i) ≤
W where a−i has (Ic − 1) strategies of liquidating and Ip strategies of preying. Further,
for Ic = 0, W (0) = W .
With this definition of W (Ic), it follows directly that — in an equilibrium13 in which
Ic traders immediately liquidate and Ip = I − Ic traders prey as in Propositions 1, 2
and 2’ — every distressed trader i ∈ Ic has wealth W i(t0) ≤ W (Ic), and every predator
i ∈ Ip has W i(t0) > W (Ic).
Interestingly, the higher is the expected number, I c, of defaulting traders, the higher
is the “survival hurdle” W (Ic).
Proposition 4 The more traders are expected to be in crisis, the harder it is to survive.
That is, W (Ic) is increasing in Ic.
This insight follows from the fact that a higher number of defaulting traders make
predation more fierce since there are fewer competing predators and more prey to
exploit. This fierce predation lowers the price at all times, making survival more
difficult.
Proposition 4 is useful in understanding systemic risk. Financial regulators are
concerned that the financial difficulty of one or two large traders can drag down many
more investors, thereby destabilizing the whole economy. Our framework helps ex-
plain why this spillover effect occurs. To see this, consider the economy depicted in
Figure 7. Trader A’s wealth is in the range of (W (1) ,W (2)], trader B’s wealth is in
(W (2) ,W (3)], and trader C’s is in (W (3) ,W (4)]. The three remaining traders (D,
E, and F) have enough reserves to fight off any crisis, that is, their wealth is above
W (I).
With these wealth levels, the unique equilibrium is such that no strategic trader is
in distress and all of them immediately start increasing their position from x (t0) to x¯.
To see this, note first that it cannot be an equilibrium that one agent defaults. If one
agent is expected to default, no one defaults because no one has wealth below W (1).
Similarly, it is not an equilibrium that two traders default, because only trader A has
wealth below W (2), and so on.
13There may be other kinds of equilibria in which some surviving traders do not prey because of
fear of driving themselves in distress. For ease of exposition, we do not consider these equilibria.
Equilibria of the form that we consider exist under regularity conditions on the initial holdings and
wealths.
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Figure 7: No trader is in distress. Figure 8: One trader drags three down.
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On the other hand, if trader D faces a wealth shock at t0 such that W
D (t0) < W ,
he can drag down traders A, B, and C, as shown in Figure 8. If it is expected that four
traders will be in distress, then traders A, B, C, and D will liquidate their position since
their wealth is below W (4). Intuitively, the fact that trader D is forced to liquidate his
position encourages predation and the price is depressed. This, in turn, brings three
other traders into financial difficulty. This situation captures the notion of systemic
risk. The financial difficulty of one trader endangers the financial stability of three
other traders.
There are also other equilibria in which 1, 2, or 3 traders face distress. For instance,
it is an equilibrium that only trader D liquidates, since if other traders do not panic
and everybody expects that only trader D will go under, traders A, B, C, E, and F
prey and buy back after a short while. The predation is less fierce in this equilibrium
in the sense that predators start re-purchasing shares earlier (i.e., turning point, t0 +τ ,
occurs earlier).
It is important to notice that the multiplicity in our example does not arise when
trader E also faces a wealth shock at t0 such that W
E (t0) < W (1). In this case, at
least two traders must liquidate, which drives A in default since A has wealth less
than W (2). Hence, at least three traders must liquidate, which makes predation yet
fiercer and drives B in default. Similarly, this results in C’s default, and we see that
the “ripple-effect” equilibrium is unique in this case.
In our perfect information setting, all traders know, the instant after t0, how the
equilibrium will play out. That is, they know the entire future price path as well as the
number of predators Ip and victims Ic. In a more complex setting in which traders’
wealth shocks are not perfectly observable and the price process is noisy, this need not
be the case. A trader might start selling shares not knowing when the price decline
stops. He might expect to act as a predator but may actually end up as prey.
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In the case of multiple equilibria, coordination by predators might lead to more
predation, while coordination by potential victims might prevent a financial crisis. For
example, coordination among predators is required if two or more predators are needed
to push the price sufficiently down to drive a third trader into financial distress. On
the other hand, coordination among vulnerable traders might prevent predation. For
example, one can imagine a situation in which the wealth level of two of three strategic
traders drops into the range (W,W (2)] such that if both these traders stay put, their
wealth level never falls below W . Thus, the predator will not attack and all traders
survive. On the other hand, if the vulnerable traders start selling along with the
predator, they drive each other into distress since the price decline erodes their wealth
to a level below W . In other words, their panic selling behavior helps the predator to
exploit the situation.
The dangers of systemic risk in financial markets provide an argument for interven-
tion by regulatory bodies, such as central banks. A bailout of one or two traders or
even only a coordination effort can stabilize prices and ensure the survival of numerous
other vulnerable traders. However, it also spoils the profit opportunity for the remain-
ing predators who would otherwise benefit from the financial crisis. From an ex-ante
perspective, the anticipation of crisis preventive action by the central bank reduces
the systemic risk of the financial sector, and hence, traders are more willing to exploit
arbitrage opportunities. This reduces the initial mispricing, but it could also worsen
agency problems not considered here.
Finally, while in our equilibrium all vulnerable traders start liquidating their posi-
tion from t0 onwards, one sometimes observes that these traders miss the opportunity
to reduce their position early. This exacerbates the predation problem, since a delayed
reaction on the part of the distressed traders allows the predators to front-run as dis-
cussed in Section 7.1. The phenomenon of delayed reaction by vulnerable traders may
be explained in an enriched version of our framework. First, if prices are fluctuating,
the trader might “gamble for resurrection” by not selling early, in the hope that a
positive price shock will liberate him from financial distress. Second, if selling activity
cannot be kept secret, a desire to appear solvent might prevent a troubled trader from
selling early.
5 Valuation with Endogenous Liquidity
Predatory trading has implications for valuation of large positions. We consider three
levels of valuation with increasing emphasis on the position’s liquidity.
Definition 2 (i) The “paper value” of a position x at time t is V paper (t, x) = xp(t);
(ii) the “orderly liquidation value” is V orderly (t, x) = x
[
p (t)− 1
2
λx
]
; and
(iii) the “distressed liquidation value”, V distressed (t, x, Ip), is the revenue raised in equi-
librium when Ip predators are preying.
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The paper value is the simple mark-to-market value of the position. The orderly
liquidation value is the revenue raised in a secret liquidation, taking into account the
fact that the demand curve is downward sloping. The downward sloping demand curve
implies that liquidation makes the price drop by λx, resulting in an average liquidation
price of p (t)− 1
2
λx.
The distressed liquidation value takes into account not only the downward sloping
demand curve, but also the strategic interaction between traders and, specifically, the
costs of predation. We note that V distressed depends on the characteristics of the market
such as the number of predators, the number of troubled traders, and their initial
holdings. For instance, the distressed valuation of a position declines if other traders
also face financial difficulty.
Clearly, the orderly liquidation value is lower than the paper value. The distressed
liquidation value is even lower if the predators have initially large positions.14
Proposition 5 If x(t0) ≥
√
Ip(Ip−1)
I−1
x¯, then the paper value of the position is greater
than the orderly liquidation value, which in turn is greater than the distressed liquidation
value. That is, V paper(x(t0)) > V
orderly(x(t0)) > V
distressed(x(t0)).
The low distressed liquidation value is a consequence of predation. In particular,
predation causes the price to initially drop much faster than what is warranted by the
distressed trader’s own sales. Hence, the market is endogenously more illiquid when a
distressed trader needs liquidity the most.
Consider a strategic trader estimating the liquidity of the market in “normal” times.
This liquidity estimate leads to an estimate of the liquidation value of V orderly. The
actual liquidation value in the case of distress, however, can be much lower.
It is interesting to consider what happens as the number of predators grows, keeping
constant their total predation capacity. More predators implies that their behavior is
more similar to that of a price-taking agent. This more competitive behavior makes
predation less fierce and increases the distressed liquidation value.
Importantly, even in the limit with infinitely many predators, the distressed liqui-
dation value is strictly lower than the orderly liquidation value. This is because the
price drops faster when there are more predators, and this leads to a reduction in the
liquidation value. Recall, in contrast, that Proposition 3 shows that the price over-
shooting disappears as the number of predators grow. It is, however, not only the price
overshooting that reduces the distressed liquidation value.
Proposition 6 Keep constant the fraction, Ip/I, of predators, the total arbitrage cap-
ital, Ix¯, and the total initial holding, Ix(t0), and suppose that Ix(t0) ≥
√
IpIx¯. Then,
14If the predators’ initial position is low, then the distressed liquidation value can be greater than
the orderly liquidation value. This is because the public announcement of a distressed liquidation
can, in this case, cause the predators to start buying shares early. This buying behavior can make the
public liquidation more profitable than a secret (orderly) liquidation.
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the total distressed liquidation value, I cV distressed is increasing in the number of preda-
tors, Ip. In the limit, as Ip approaches infinity, the total distressed liquidation revenue
remains strictly smaller than the total orderly liquidation value,
limIp→∞ I
cV distressed (x (t0)) < V
orderly (Icx(t0)).
One could further apply our framework to study the ex-ante value of a large position
(and the expertise in trading in this market), taking into account the risk of predation
against oneself and the possible rewards from predation against others. This would be
relevant, for instance, when considering a take-over of a hedge fund.
6 The Investment Phase (t ∈ [0, t0))
So far, we have taken the number, x (t0), of shares that traders hold before predation
starts as given. In this section, we analyze the process of acquisition of the initial
position prior to t0. The strategic traders’ initial position at time 0 — when they learn
of the arbitrage opportunity — is assumed to be zero. To separate the investment
phase from the predatory phase, we assume that t0 occurs sufficiently late, that is,
t0 >
x¯
A/I
. This ensures that traders can acquire any position x ∈ [−x¯, x¯] prior to
t0. We focus, in this section, on the case in which at most one strategic trader faces
financial crisis. Specifically, we assume that with probability pi, I c is a singleton with
all traders having equal probability of being in crisis, and with probability 1 − pi, no
trader is in crisis, that is, Ic = ∅.15 Proposition 7 describes the initial trading by large
strategic investors.
Proposition 7 First, all traders buy at the rate A/I until they have accumulated a
position of x(t0). If I > 2 and a distressed trader’s position is not disclosed, then
x (t0) =
(
1− pi
I
)
x¯.
If I = 2 or if a distressed trader’s position is disclosed, then
x (t0) =
(
1− pi
I − 1
)
x¯.
After time t0, traders use the (predatory) strategies described in Propositions 1, 2, and
2’.
All traders try to acquire their desired position x (t0) as quickly as possible. This is
because delay is costly, since other traders’ acquisitions increase the price. Importantly,
15Here, we make (implicitly) the simplifying assumption that the default risk does not depend on
the size of the position.
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it is this desire of the traders to quickly acquire a large position that later leaves them
vulnerable to predation.
The optimal pre-t0 position, x (t0), balances the costs and benefits associated with
the three possible outcomes: (i) no trader faces crisis, (ii) another trader faces crisis,
and (iii) the trader himself is in crisis. First, with probability 1−pi, no strategic trader
faces financial distress before time T . In this case, all traders try to acquire additional
shares up to their maximum position x¯ after time t0. A trader who acquired a larger
position prior to t0 has the advantage that he purchased it at a lower price.
Second, with probability pi I−1
I
, one of the other traders faces financial difficulty and
must liquidate his position. In this case, it is advantageous for a surviving trader to
have a smaller position x (t0) since it is cheaper to acquire the shares after t0.
Finally, with probability pi
I
, the trader himself must liquidate his position. In this
case, the effect of having initially bought — out of equilibrium — a large position
depends on whether this position is disclosed. If the distressed trader’s position is
made public, then it is always worse, in case of distress, to have bought a larger
position. This is because the predation makes the liquidation very costly.
If a distressed trader’s position is not disclosed and if I > 2, then the effect of
initially buying some extra shares may be reversed because the initial purchase is secret.
This explains why the initial position is larger in the case of no disclosure (1 − pi
I
>
1− pi
I−1
). More general implications of disclosure are discussed in Subsection 7.4.
The default and predation risks limit the traders’ willingness to build a large arbi-
trage position, that is, x (t0) < x¯. It is interesting to compare the total initial arbitrage
position, Ix (t0), with the expected surviving arbitrage capital. The expected number
of survivors is I − pi, so the expected surviving arbitrage capital is x¯(I − pi).
If I = 2 or if there is disclosure, the initial total arbitrage position, Ix(t0) =
x¯(I − pi I
I−1
), is lower than the expected surviving arbitrage capital. This is because
of the large cost associated with selling (an extra unit) to a monopolist predator or
to predators who know that you bought the extra shares. Hence, the risk of costly
predation limits the arbitrage positions, and this initially makes the price depart further
away from the expected value of the asset.
With I > 2 and if there is no disclosure, the initial total arbitrage position is equal
to the expected surviving arbitrage capital, that is, Ix(t0) = x¯ (I − pi). This leads to
a “martingale-like” property of the price. This is because, in case one defaults, the
marginal share is sold at a “fair” price when all the predators have bought back their
position. If the risk of default was increasing in the size of the position, however, then
arbitrage positions would initially be smaller.
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7 Further Implications of Predatory Trading
7.1 Front-running
So far, we have considered equilibria in which the distressed traders sell at the same
time as the predators. Anecdotal evidence suggests that, in some cases, the predators
are selling before the distressed trader. That is, the predators are truly front-running.
There are various potential reasons for the delayed selling by the distressed traders.
They might hope that they will face a positive wealth shock that will allow them to
overcome the financial difficulty and avoid liquidation and default costs. Alternatively,
the distressed trader may not be aware that the predator — for instance, the trader’s
own investment bank — is preying on him. Finally, the predators could simply have an
ability to trade faster. In any case, front-running makes predation even more profitable.
The equilibrium with a single predator is simple. First, the predator sells as much as
possible. Then, he waits for the distressed trader to depress the price by liquidating his
position, and finally the predator repurchases his position. Clearly, the price overshoots
and the predation makes liquidation costly.
The equilibrium with many predators can also easily be analyzed within our frame-
work. Suppose that, at time t0, it is clear that I
c traders are in financial distress, and
that these traders start selling at time t1, where t1 > t0 +
IcIp
A(Ip−1)
x.
The predatory trading plays out as follows. First, the predators front-run by selling.
This leads to an excessively large price drop. When the distressed traders start selling,
the predators are buying back, and the price recovers to its new equilibrium level.
Proposition 8 With Ip ≥ 2 and x (t0) ≥ Ip−1I−1 x¯, in the unique symmetric equilibrium,
each distressed trader sells with constant speed A/I for x(t0)
A/I
periods starting at time
t1. Each predator i ∈ Ip starts selling from t0 onwards at trading intensity A/Ip for
τ := (I−1)x(t0)−x¯(I
p−1)
A(Ip−1)/Ip
periods and buys back shares at a trading intensity of A
I
Ic
Ip−1
from
t1 onwards. That is,
ai∗ (t) =


−A/Ip for t ∈ [t0, t0 + τ)
0 for t ∈ [t0 + τ , t1)
AIc
I(Ip−1)
for t ∈ [t1, t1 + x(t0)A/I )
0 for t ≥ t1 + x(t0)A/I .
(14)
The price overshoots; the price dynamics is
p∗ (t) =


p (t0)− λA [t− t0] for t ∈ [t0, t0 + τ)
p (t0)− λAτ for t ∈ [t0 + τ , t1)
p (t0)− λAτ + λAI I
c
Ip−1
[t− t1] for t ∈ [t1, t1 + x(t0)A/I )
µ + λ [x¯Ip − S] for t ≥ t1 + x(t0)A/I .
(15)
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where p (t0) = µ + λIx (t0) − λS. The ability to front-run by predators imply larger
liquidation costs for distressed traders and greater price overshooting.
Changes in the composition of main stock indices force index funds to re-balance
their portfolios to minimize their tracking errors. While prior to 1989 changes in the
composition of S&P occurred without prior notice, from 1989 onwards they were an-
nounced one week in advance. The price dynamics during these intermediate weeks sug-
gest index that tracking funds re-balance their portfolio around the inclusion/deletion
date, while strategic traders front-run by trading immediately after the announcement.
Lynch and Mendenhall (1997) documents a sharp price rise (drop) on the announce-
ment day, a continued rise (decline) until the actual inclusion (deletion), and a partial
price reversal on the days following the inclusion (deletion). Hence, consistent with
our model’s predictions, there appears to be front-running and price overshooting.
The highest volume occurs on the day prior to the inclusion (deletion), indicating that
most of the index funds trade on this day. If so, the empirical observations are not
fully in line with the model, since it predicts that the reversal starts already on this
day (not the following day as in the data), unless there is a monopolist strategic trader
or traders collude.
7.2 Batch Auction Markets, Trading Halts, Circuit Breakers
The degree of price overshooting and predatory behavior depends on the market struc-
ture. In this subsection, we consider a setting in which orders are batched together in
a call auction market immediately after some traders are forced to sell their holdings
at t0. We assume that distressed traders must sell their entire holding at the batch
auction. Their orders are batched with the remaining predators’ market orders and the
long-term traders’ continuum of limit orders. After all orders are collected, they are
executed at a single price. This prevents the predators from walking down the demand
curve. After the batch auction sequential trading resumes and the market structure is
as before.
Note that trading halts and circuit breakers work exactly this way. Trading is
suspended for some time and orders are collected. Trading recommences with the
standard opening procedure which is organized as a batch auction on most stock ex-
changes. Continuous trading resumes after the new opening price is found.
Proposition 9 describes the equilibrium behavior of the predators and the price
dynamics for this setting.
Proposition 9 With x (t0) ≥ Ip−1I−1 x¯, each predator submits a buy order of size I
p−1
Ip
[x− x (t0)]
at the batch auction at t0. Thereafter, each predator buys at a trading intensity of A/I
p
for [x− x (t0)] /A periods.
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The price dynamics is
p∗ (t) =


µ− λS + λ (Ip − 1) x + λx (t0) at the batch auction at t0
µ− λS + λ (Ip − 1) x + λx (t0) + λA [t− t0] for t ∈ [t0, t0 + x−x(t0)A )
µ− λS + λIpx¯ for t ≥ t0 + x−x(t0)A .
(16)
The price overshooting is smaller compared to the setting without batch auction.
In contrast to the sequential market structure, predators do not sell shares. How-
ever, they are still reluctant to provide liquidity as long as competitive forces are weak.
To see this, note that a single predator will not participate in the batch auctions at
all, while in the case of multiple predators each individual predator’s order size is lim-
ited to I
p−1
Ip
[x− x (t0)]. This explains why some price overshooting remains. After the
batch auction, the surviving predators build up their final position x (T ) = x as fast
as possible in continuous trading. Hence, the price gradually increases until it reaches
the same long-run level p (T ) = µ−λS +λIpx¯. The price overshooting is substantially
lower compared to the sequential trading mechanism and the new long-run equilibrium
price is reached more quickly.
7.3 Risk Management
Predatory trading amplifies default risk. Hence, a detailed examination of predation
risk should be one pillar in any risk management analysis. This is especially the case
for large traders, such as hedge funds, who often hold illiquid assets.
One lesson which emerges from this paper is that risk management strategies that
follow publicly known mechanical rules invite predatory trading by other traders. In
general, granting fund managers more flexibility and making the trading strategy less
stringent reduces predation risk, but it also limits the control over the manager. Exam-
ples of such mechanical rules include dynamic hedging strategies like portfolio insurance
trading. Viewed from this angle, our mechanism provides a fresh perspective on the
stock market crash of 1987. An initial price decline forced many portfolio insurance
traders to sell their shares.16 Other strategic traders who were aware of this fact preyed
on them and hence exacerbated the fall. Consistent with this result, the Brady Report
(Brady et al. (1988), p. 15) states:
... This precipitous decline began with several “triggers,” which ignited
mechanical, price-insensitive selling by a number of institutions following
16Gennotte and Leland (1990) also studies the crash in the context of portfolio insurance. They
assume that a large fraction of investors are less informed, not aware that the initial selling was due
to non-informative liquidation needs, similar to our long-term investors. While they consider a static
model, our paper considers the dynamics.
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portfolio insurance strategies and a small number of mutual fund groups.
The selling by these investors, and the prospect of further selling by them,
encouraged a number of aggressive trading-oriented institutions to sell in
anticipation of further declines. These aggressive trading-oriented insti-
tutions included, in addition to hedge funds, a small number of pension
and endowment funds, money management firms and investment banking
houses. This selling in turn stimulated further reactive selling by portfolio
insurers and mutual funds. ...
While a fund’s mechanical trading rules increase the risk that others prey on it,
“predation risk” is magnified if many large traders follow similar risk management
strategies. In the event of a wealth decline, fewer predators are left in the market,
which exacerbates predation and the systemic risk component. Consequently, each
fund’s optimal risk management strategy depends on other traders’ risk management
in addition to the liquidity of the acquired assets.
Risk analysis should also take into account that predation can discourage a large
trader from seeking outside financing to bridge temporary financial losses. This is
because the trader may have to reveal its positions and trading strategy to the possible
creditors, such as the trader’s brokers, exposing the trader to predatory trading.
Many loans are secured by collateral assets, which the broker can sell at short
notice if margin requirements are not met. Such fire-sales depress the selling price and
increases the fund’s (possible temporary) financial distress. An illustrative example
is the case of Granite Partners (Askin Capital Management) whose main brokers —
Merrill Lynch, DLJ and others — gave the fund less than 24 hours to meet a margin
call. Merrill Lynch and DLJ then allegedly sold off collateral assets at below market
price at an insider-only auction where bids were solicited from a restricted number of
other brokers excluding retail institutional investors.
Our analysis further implies that large traders can benefit from dealing with mul-
tiple brokers and banks to reduce the amount of sensitive information known by each
counterparty and to ensure that possible predatory trading is not too fierce or monop-
olistic.
7.4 Disclosure
Enforcing strict disclosure rules concerning a fund’s security positions or risk manage-
ment strategy increases “predation risk” in illiquid markets, and hence, can undermine
the objective of the fund’s investors. On the other hand, if there is much “available”
arbitrage capital (i.e., other strategic traders have low current positions, x(t0), relative
to their limits, x¯), then it can be beneficial to publicly announce a liquidation since
this will enhance competition to acquire the position (Proposition 2’). Also, disclosure
improves monitoring of the fund manager. The optimal balance for this trade-off de-
pends on the liquidity of the position, the fund’s size, and the fund’s agency problems.
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IAFE Investor Risk Committee (IRC) (2001) argues along similar lines by favoring
less detailed disclosure for large funds. The predatory risk of disclosure is reduced if
it concerns the portfolio’s characteristics rather than the specific positions, or if the
disclosure is delayed in time. Second, our analysis suggests that any disclosed informa-
tion should be dispersed as broadly as possible, in order to minimize the implications
of predatory trading.
We have shown in Section 6 that disclosing the position of a distressed trader also
alters the his ex-ante incentives to take on (arbitrage) positions. The fear of being
preyed upon makes strategic traders less aggressive, and hence, larger mispricings can
remain.
7.5 Bear Raids and the Uptick Rule
A bear raid is a special form of predatory trading, which was not uncommon prior to
1933 according to Eiteman, Dice, and Eiteman (1966).17 A ring of traders identifies
and sells short a stock that other investors hold long on their margin accounts. This
depresses the stock’s price and triggers margin calls for the long investors, who are then
forced to sell their shares, further deflating the price. Based on his (allegedly first-hand)
knowledge of these practices, Joe Kennedy, the first head of the SEC, introduced the
so-called up-tick rule to prevent bear raids. This rule bans short-sales during a falling
market. In the context of our model, this means that strategic traders with small
initial positions, x(t0), cannot undertake predatory trading. This reduces the price
overshooting and increases the distressed traders’ liquidation revenue.
7.6 Contagion
Predatory trading suggests a novel mechanism for financial contagion. Suppose that
the strategic traders have large positions in several markets. Further, suppose that
a large strategic trader incurs a loss in one market, bringing this trader in financial
trouble. Then, this large trader must downsize his operations. Hence, he reduces all
his positions. As explained by our model, other traders have an incentive to undertake
predatory trading, thereby enhancing the price impact in all affected markets.
This type of contagion is not driven by a correlation in economic fundamentals or by
information spillovers but, rather, by the composition of the holdings of large traders
who must significantly reduce their positions. This insight has the following empirical
implication: a shock to one security, which is held by large vulnerable traders, may be
contagious to other securities that are also held by the vulnerable traders.
17The origin of the term “bear” goes back to the 18th century, where it described a trader who sold
the bear’s skin before he had caught it.
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8 Conclusion
This paper provides a new framework for studying the phenomenon of predatory trad-
ing. Predatory trading is important in connection with large security trades in illiquid
markets. We show that predatory trading leads to price overshooting and amplifies a
large trader’s liquidation cost and default risk. Hence, “predation risk” should be a pri-
mary component of risk management. Predatory trading introduces systemic risk since
a financial shock to one trader may spill over and trigger a crisis for the whole financial
sector. Consequently, our analysis provides an argument in favor of coordinated ac-
tions by regulators or bailout. Our analysis has further implications for the regulation
of securities trading and of large strategic traders, and it explains the advantages of
circuit breakers and of the up-tick rule.
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The distressed trader’s strategy is optimal since any faster liquidation leads to tempo-
rary price impact costs.
The surviving trader, i, wants to minimize
∫ T
t0
ai (t) X−i (t) dt subject to the con-
straints that xi(T ) = x¯ and |ai(t)| ≤ A/I. Here, X−i (t) is the position of the trader
in financial trouble so
X−i (t) =
{
x(t0)− t A/I for t ∈ [t0, t0 + x(t0)I/A]
0 for t > t0 + x(t0)I/A
Since X−i (t) is decreasing,
∫ T
t0
ai (t) X−i (t) dt is minimized by choosing the control
variable as stated in the proposition.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose that x (t0) ≥ Ip−1I−1 x¯. A distressed trader’s strategy is optimal, given the other
traders’ actions, since (i) until time t0 + τ , the price is falling and the distressed trader
is selling as fast as he can without incurring temporary impact costs; and (ii) after time
t0 + τ , the price is rising and the distressed trader is selling at the minimal required
speed.
To see the optimality of a predator’s strategy, suppose, without loss of generality,
that trader i is not the trader in financial crisis and that all other traders are using the
proposed equilibrium strategies. Then, the total position, X−i (t), of the other traders
is
X−i (t) =
{
(I − 1) (x(t0)− AI t) for t ∈ [t0, t0 + τ ]
(Ip − 1) x¯ for t > t0 + τ .
27
Trader i wants to minimize
∫ T
t0
ai (t) X−i (t) dt subject to the constraints that xi(T ) = x¯
and ai(t) ∈ [a, a]. Since X−i (t) is decreasing and then constant, ∫ T
t0
ai (t) X−i (t) dt is
minimized by choosing ai = a as long as X−i (t) is decreasing and by choosing a
positive ai thereafter. Hence, the ai that is described in the proposition is optimal.
We note that trader i’s objective function does not depend on the speed with which
he buys back after time τ . There is a single speed, however, which is consistent with
the equilibrium.
To prove the uniqueness of this equilibrium, we note that, in any symmetric equilib-
rium, X−i must satisfy the following: (i) X−i(t) > (Ip − 1) x¯ implies X˙−i(t) = −A I−1
I
(ii) X−i(t) < (Ip − 1) x¯ implies X˙−i(t) = A (1− I+Ic
IpI
)
> 0. It is easily seen that there
is a unique X−i(t) satisfying these two conditions.
A.3 Proposition 2’ and Its Proof
Proposition 2’ Suppose that x (t0) <
Ip−1
I−1
x¯ and let τ := −x(t0)−
Ip−1
I−1
x¯
A(1− I+I
c
IpI )
. The unique
symmetric equilibrium strategy is for each predator i ∈ Ip to buy fast for τ periods and
keep buying at a lower trading intensity until t0 +
x(t0)
A/I
. More precisely,
ai∗ (t) =


A(I+Ip)
IP I
for t ∈ [t0, t0 + τ)
AIc
I(Ip−1)
for t ∈ [t0 + τ , t0 + x(t0)A/I )
0 for t ≥ t0 + x(t0)A/I .
(17)
Proof
Analogous to the proof of Proposition 2.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
The size of the overshooting, that is, the difference between the lowest price (which is
achieved at time t0 + τ) and the new equilibrium price is x¯I
c/(I − 1). This difference
approaches zero as the number of agents increases, i.e.,
x¯Ic
I − 1 =
(x¯I) (Ic/I)
I − 1 → 0,
since x¯I and Ic/I are constant. 
A.5 Proof of Proposition 4
To show that W (Ic) is increasing in Ic, we show that the paper wealth, W i(t, ai, a−i),
at any time t is (weakly) decreasing in I c. The paper wealth is increasing in the
holding, X−i, of the other traders. With higher I c, more agents are liquidating their
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entire holding, reducing X−i. Further, the remaining predators reverse from selling to
buying at a later time since τ (defined in Proposition 2) is increasing in I c, which also
reduces X−i. 
A.6 Proof of Proposition 5
Clearly, V paper > V orderly. If there is only one predator, then it follows immediately
from Proposition 1 that V orderly > V distressed. If there are multiple predators, the
distressed liquidation value is computed using Proposition 2. After tedious calculations,
the result is
V distressed = x(t0)p(t0)− 1
2
λ
(
Ix(t0)
2 − I
p (Ip − 1)
I − 1 x¯
2
)
. (18)
It follows that V orderly > V distressed under the condition stated in the proposition. 
A.7 Proof of Proposition 6
We note first that Ix(t0) ≥
√
IpIx¯ implies that, for all I, x (t0) ≥ Ip−1I−1 x¯. Hence,
Proposition 2 applies and we can use (18) to compute the total distressed liquidation
value:
IcV distressed = Icx(t0)p(t0)− 1
2
λ
(
IcIx(t0)
2 − (I
p − 1)
I − 1 I
cIpx¯2
)
. (19)
Since Ix(t0), I
px(t0), and I
cx(t0) are assumed independent of I, all the terms in (19)
are independent of I, except the term involving (Ip−1)/(I−1). This term is increasing
in the number of agents, yielding the first result in the proposition. In the limit as the
number of agents increases, the total distressed liquidation value is
Icx(t0)p(t0)− 1
2
λ
(
IcIx(t0)
2 − I
p
I
IcIpx¯2
)
. (20)
This value is greater than the orderly liquidation value, I cx(t0)
(
p(t0)− 12λIcx(t0)
)
,
under the condition Ix(t0) ≥
√
IpIx¯. 
A.8 Proof of Proposition 7
We give a sketch of the proof. To see the optimality of trader i’s strategy, we first note
that, for any value of xi(t0), it is optimal to use the equilibrium strategy after time
t0. The argument for this follows from the proofs of Propositions 1 and 2. Further,
prior to t0, it is optimal to acquire shares at a rate of a until the trader has reached
his pre-t0 target. This follows from the incentive to acquire the position before other
traders drive up the price.
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The equilibrium level of x(t0) is derived in the remainder of the proof. We consider
trader i’s expected profit in connection with buying x(t0) + ∆ shares, given that other
traders buy x(t0) shares. More precisely, we use Lemma 1 and consider how the
marginal ∆ infinitesimal shares affect the “trading cost”
∫
ai(t)X−i(t)dt. First, buying
∆ infinitesimal extra shares prior to time t0 costs ∆(I − 1)x(t0) since the shares are
optimally bought when the other traders have finished buying and X−i = (I − 1)x(t0).
The benefit, after t0, of having bought the ∆ shares depends on whether (i) no
trader is in distress, (ii) another trader is in distress, or (iii) the trader himself is in
distress:
(i) If no trader is in distress, then having the extra ∆ shares saves a purchase at
the per share cost of X−i = (I − 1)x¯. This is because the marginal shares are bought
in the end when the other (I − 1) traders each have acquired a position of x¯.
(ii) If another trader is in financial distress then having the extra ∆ shares saves
a purchase at the per-share cost of X−i = (I − 2)x¯. This is the total position of the
other I − 2 predators when the defaulting trader has liquidated his entire position.
(iii a) Suppose I > 2 and the position of the distressed trader is not disclosed at
time t0. Then, if the trader himself is in financial distress, the extra ∆ shares can be
sold when X−i = (I − 1)x¯. This is the position of the predators when one has just
finished liquidating. At that time the predators have preyed and re-purchased their
position.
(iii b) Suppose I = 2 or that the position of the distressed trader is disclosed at
time t0. Then, if the trader himself is in financial distress, the extra ∆ shares can be
sold when X−i = (I − 2)x¯. To see this, note that the extra shares imply that the
predators prey longer (τ larger) because they know that one must liquidate a larger
position. Hence, the marginal shares are effectively sold at the worst time when X−i
is at its lowest point.
We can now derive the equilibrium x(t0) by imposing the requirement that the
marginal cost of buying the extra shares equals the marginal benefit. In the case in
which I > 2 and the position of the distressed trader is not disclosed at time t0, we
have
(I − 1)x(t0) = (1− pi)(I − 1)x¯ + piI − 1
I
(I − 2)x¯ + pi 1
I
(I − 1)x¯,
implying that
x(t0) = (1− pi
I
)x¯.
In the case in which I = 2 or the position of the distressed trader is disclosed at time
t0, we have
(I − 1)x(t0) = (1− pi)(I − 1)x¯ + piI − 1
I
(I − 2)x¯ + pi 1
I
(I − 2)x¯,
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